
Kevin W
 |
If Lee's plan had been carried out as he wished on the third day (July 3), perhaps the Confederates would have won. You'll hardly find ANY histories, which purport to portray the plans for this day, which are correct. Almost without exception writers have focused on "Pickett's Charge" as though this were Lee's entire plan. What Lee actually intended was for the 15,000 or so men in Pickett's Charge to attack simultaneously with Stuart's 6,000 cavalry, who were to come in from the rear, behind the Union line, at the same place. This would have pinched the Union army into two smaller pieces, which could have been dealt with in detail, first in the north, with Ewell's Corps joining in. Stuart was sent on a long circuitous route to the north of Gettysburg to circle back and attack the union rear when Pickett's Charge went in. If you ever visit Gettysburg, there is a portion of the preserved battlefield several miles to the east of town, called "East Cavalry Field". This is where Stuart allowed himself to be stopped by, of all people, Custer. Thus Stuart did not come in on the Yankee rear when Pickett approached, and the result was Pickett's unsupported frontal attack. Many of the reports cavalry officers filed after the battle are clear that this was the purpose of Stuart's movement, and almost all historians have succeeded in completely ignoring this plan, and have cast about for reasons Lee would try such an uncharacteristic frontal attack, some concluding that Lee was "not himself". Lee was entirely himself, taking his cues for his battle plan from the study of Napoleon's tactics. The only other time Lee had resorted to an unsupported frontal attack was a year earlier, barely one month after taking command of the Army, at Malvern Hill. He never did again, despite the barrels of ink spilled claiming he did at Gettysburg.
Stuart had returned with his cavalry on the previous day. His absence had NOT left Lee completely without cavalry, but the brigades who had stayed with Lee were not the best or the ones Lee trusted the most. (Imboden's, Robertson's).
Jackson had of course been dead nearly two months.
If Lee had listened to Longstreet on the second day, when Longstreet discovered the attack he was ordered to put in would in fact NOT fall on the end of the Union line at the Round Tops, but would instead be an attack on a diagonal into the Union line, then the Confederates might have succeeded that day. Longstreet wanted to move further to the east so that his attack would fall on the end of the Union line. But it was about 4 PM and it had taken all day to get the troops as far as they were. Lee was impatient with Longstreet, who may have dallied in his lack of enthusiasm for the plan, and ordered the attack to go in as ordered.
Writing long after the battle Porter Alexander made cogent criticisms. It would have been far better on the third day to mass confederate artillery at two points near the ends of their line, so that their fire would range ALONG the union line, in enfilade, rather than to employ the cannon as they were used. The Confederate artillery was distributed along their line and their fire was perpendicular to the union line. Given the notorious unreliability of Confederate fuses, which seldom exploded when intended, this arrangement saw most of the barrage before Pickett's Charge pass over the Union line and strike behind, causing considerable confusion in the rear.
Porter also noted that it would have been far better to make the charge on a north-south axis, into the curve of the fish-hook shaped union line. This would have prevented even neighboring troops from helping the Yanks at the point of the assault, as their line bent back and away on both sides. As it was, where Pickett's attack went in, all troops for a long distance on either side could, and did, fire in support of the units directly in the path of the attack. |

Robin
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that is my firm belief
longstreet had good recommendations
that jackson was sightseeing instead of tending to business is correct
but feint on lee's left and attack from R flank would have been better, than the other way around
chamberlin got congressional medal for his defense of little round top, and it was a close thing as it was, if chamberlain had failed, the line might have been rolled up
pickett's charge was foolishness, i have walked the route of that charge, and admire the resolution of the troops
picketts charge also was a near thing, but damn foolish to run a mile through artillery, and expect to assault stationary troops after the movement |